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Abstract 
Drawing on principal-agent perspectives on corporate governance, the paper examines whether 
employees’ hourly pay is related to ownership dispersion. Using linked employee-workplace data 
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from the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) 2011, and using a variety of 
techniques including interval regression and propensity score matching, average hourly pay is found 
to be higher in dispersed ownership workplaces. The premium is broadly constant across most of the 
wage distribution, but falls at the 95th percentile to become statistically non-significant. This 
contrasts with earlier papers which indicate that higher level employees are the primary beneficiaries 
of higher pay from dispersed ownership. The findings are not supportive of efficiency wages 
explanations but are consistent with a managerial desire for a 'quiet life' 
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1.  Introduction 
Industrial relations scholars have recently highlighted the potential for ownership and corporate 
governance to influence a range of human resource management and industrial relations 
characteristics (Black et al. 2007; Gospel and Pendleton 2003, 2005; Kim and Kim 2014; 
Konzelmann et al. 2008; Liu et al. 2014).  In this vein, this paper considers whether employee pay 
differs between workplaces where ownership is dispersed and those where it is more concentrated.  
Drawing on agency theory, the starting point is that managers have greater discretion (vis-à-vis 
owners) in wage-setting when ownership is widely-held, because dispersed owners have weaker 
incentives to monitor managers than those with more concentrated ownership.  For various reasons 
managers may exploit this discretion to pay their workforces (and themselves) more than in those 
workplaces with concentrated ownership.  
   Matched employee and establishment data from the Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey (WERS), conducted in Great Britain in 2011, are used to examine this question.  The main 
result is clear and consistent: dispersed ownership is associated with higher hourly pay, even after 
the inclusion of an extensive range of demographic, job, and workplace controls.  Log hourly 
average pay differs by about 0.30 log points.  However, workers in dispersed ownership workplaces 
have several characteristics typically associated with higher pay: in particular there is a greater 
proportion of higher level occupations with an accompanying higher level of qualifications.  But 
even after taking these and other compositional factors into account, there is a pay gap of around 
0.07 log points.  This ownership premium is similar in magnitude to that found in one of the few 
other studies of this topic (Cronqvist et al. 2009). 
A striking and original feature of our results is that a pay differential is found across most of 
the wage distribution.  The raw gap in average hourly pay rises across most of the distribution but 
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falls somewhat at the top end.  Once worker and workplace characteristics are added, the ownership 
premium settles at around 0.07 log points across most of the pay distribution except at the 95
th
 
percentile where the premium is smaller and non-significant.  In fact, a comparison of managers and 
other occupations finds that the dispersed ownership premium for managers is lower than for other 
occupations and is non-significant.  This finding contrasts with the rest of the literature, where top 
managers are found to be the primary beneficiaries of dispersed ownership.      
These results contribute to a growing literature in Labour Economics, Industrial Relations 
(IR), and Human Resource Management (HRM) which relates variations in employee remuneration 
to ownership and governance characteristics (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Cronqvist et al. 
2009; Gorton and Schmidt 1999; Kim and Kim 2014; Konzelmann et al. 2008; Kreuger 1991; Liu et 
al. 2014; Werner et al. 2005).  The results are also consistent with a longer tradition highlighting 
pay differentials between firms for otherwise similar employees (reviewed below), though our focus 
on ownership dispersion is a novel one.  This study is also notable for using employee rather than 
enterprise-level pay data.  This gives us two advantages over nearly all other studies of ownership 
and pay.  First, we are able to quantify the role of worker and workplace characteristics to a much 
greater extent.  Second, we can examine pay differences across the pay distribution and thus 
evaluate the extent to which any pay premium extends beyond managers.   
The reasons for the pay premium in dispersed ownership workplaces are considered in the 
paper.  Some have argued or implied that differential application of efficiency wages is responsible 
for pay differences between dispersed and concentrated ownership (Harrell-Cook and Ferris 1997; 
Gorton and Schmidt 1999; Liu et al.. 2014).  We are inclined to discount this explanation because 
the pay gap persists after worker quality is controlled for, some of our results seem to be 
inconsistent with efficiency wages, and moreover there is no clear theoretical reason why dispersed 
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ownership workplaces are more likely to pay efficiency wages.  An important alternative 
explanation found in the literature (Bertrand and Mullanaithan 2003; Cronqvist et al. 2009) proposes 
that self-interested managers will opportunistically seek a ‘quiet life’ where there is weak 
monitoring by principals (as in principal agent theory) and they will pay their workers more to 
secure this.  We incline towards this view and, in conjunction with the absence of a significant 
premium for managers, suggest that the benefit to managers of high pay for workers where there is 
dispersed ownership takes a non-pecuniary form.    
 The paper begins by discussing perspectives on the impact of ownership dispersion on 
employees’ pay.  A review of the limited empirical literature indicates that managerial discretion, 
emanating from ownership structure, tends to be associated with higher pay, especially for top 
managers.  The paper then provides information on the WERS survey data and our analytical 
approach.  Results are presented for a series of models where ownership dispersion is the key 
independent variable, followed by a set of quantile models and occupational comparisons.  Our main 
finding is that the dispersed ownership premium persists after controlling for an extensive set of 
controls, that it is robust to workplace matching, and that it is constant across most of the pay 
distribution except at the top end.  The conclusion considers the implications of this finding, 
discusses potential limitations, and suggests some areas for further research.       
 
2.  Background 
There is increasing interest in the relationship between company ownership, governance, and 
employment outcomes (Black et al. 2007; Gospel et al. 2014; Gospel and Pendleton 2005; Jacoby 
2005; Kim and Kim 2014; Liu et al. 2014; Pagano and Volpin 2005).  Much of the evidence has 
centred on the relationships between ownership or governance and job tenure and skill formation, 
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typically adopting a comparative perspective (Black et al. 2007; Felstead 2016; Hall and Gingerich 
2009).  The relationship between ownership and workers’ pay has attracted less attention, though 
there is a rich stream of research on ownership, governance, and executive compensation, especially 
stock options, in the Corporate Governance (CG) literature (Murphy 1999; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 
1989; Tosi et al.. 1999; Bebchuk and Fried 2004).   
 Standard economic theory suggests that corporate ownership and control should have no 
influence on pay.  In competitive theory, workers’ pay is a function of labour supply and demand 
and will therefore be determined exogenously.  According to the ‘law of one price’, workers are 
paid according to their marginal product, homogeneous workers are paid the same wage, and firms 
cannot persistently pay more than the market rate.  However, over many years, research has shown 
how managerial policies can influence pay levels and that some firms pay higher wages than others 
for the same class of labour (Abowd et al. 1999; Barth 1994; Groshen 1991; Krueger and Summers 
1988; Lazear 1999; Lester 1952).  For example, efficiency wage theories suggest that some firms 
pay wages above market-clearing levels to provide incentives and raise shirking costs, thereby 
boosting labour productivity (Akerlof 1982; Krueger 1991; Lazear 1999).  There is also evidence 
that wage levels are related to employers’ ability to pay and that rent-sharing may explain variation 
in wages between firms for otherwise similar work (Blanchflower et al. 1996).   
However, one possible influence on managerial readiness to pay higher wages could be 
ownership structure (Krueger 1991).  A key difference may be posited between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ 
owners, arising from ownership concentration, with the former able to monitor managers more 
closely than the latter (Roe 1994).  All things being equal, owners with large, concentrated 
ownership stakes will have (a) greater incentives and (b) lower costs to control managerial policies.  
By contrast, dispersed owners have weaker incentives and more limited ability to monitor 
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managerial behaviour, leaving managers with more discretion (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  The 
costs incurred by any dispersed owner seeking to monitor and discipline managers may well exceed 
their fraction of any gains.  Since wage costs are often a substantial proportion of firm costs, strong 
owners have a clear interest in expending effort to control wages and to ensure that owner interests 
are protected in the distribution of returns (Harrell-Cook and Ferris 1997).   
In a principal-agent setting, less constrained managers with weak owners may pursue private 
benefits such as high pay for themselves, as highlighted by recent studies of top executive pay 
(Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Tosi et al. 1999).  But why should managers pay high wages to other 
workers?  The literature highlights several possibilities.  One, less constrained managers may pursue 
‘empire-building’ policies (Baumol 1959; Marris 1964; Williamson 1964) which may benefit 
workers’ pay, given that organizational size typically correlates with employees’ wages (Brown and 
Medoff 1989).  Two, high pay for workers may legitimise high managerial salaries (Wade et al. 
1997).  Three, ‘lazy’ managers (Aghion et al. 2013) may pay other workers high wages to secure a 
‘quiet life’ (Hicks 1969: 57-9).  Well-paid workers are likely to be more cooperative with managers 
and less likely to quit (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Cronqvist et al. 2009), thereby providing 
non-pecuniary benefits to managers.  Four, highly-paid workers may form alliances with managers, 
acting as ‘white squires’ in support of incumbent managers in the event of unwelcome takeovers.   
High pay and benefits can also function as ‘shark repellents’ by making it costly for potential 
acquirers to buy-out high wage contracts (Pagano and Volpin 2005).    
Over the years a small number of studies have generated relevant evidence, finding that 
managers are the primary, but not the only, pay beneficiaries of dispersed ownership.  Krueger 
(1991) compared pay levels between franchisee (i.e. concentrated ownership) and company-owned 
fast-food outlets.  The former paid lower wages due to stronger owner involvement in wage-setting 
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and more powerful incentives.  More recently, Cronqvist et al. (2009), using matched Swedish 
employer-employee data, found that CEOs who own more voting rights than all other block-holders 
combined pay their workers higher wages.  The pay premium ranges from about 5 to 8 per cent 
depending on model specification.
1
  They also found that employees who are close to the CEO in 
the organisational hierarchy benefit more than other workers.  They attribute the premium to a 
managerial desire for a quiet life, on the grounds that the premium is larger in industries organised 
by what they term ‘aggressive’ trade unions.  They argue that the premium is higher in these 
circumstances because this is where it is most costly for the CEO to exert effort to secure a lower 
wage bill.  However, cash flow rights from executive stock ownership provide a counter-incentive 
and attenuate the positive effects on workers’ pay.   
Werner et al. (2005), using Compustat data, compared changes in average pay in owner-
controlled, owner-managed, and management-controlled (i.e. dispersed ownership) firms, where 
managerial control is defined as the absence of any external block-holders with 5 per cent or more of 
outstanding stock.
2
  Managerial control is associated with a de-coupling of pay increases from firm 
performance and a closer linkage between pay increases and firm growth, findings which the authors 
argue are consistent with empire building.
3
  Although their study differentiates between changes in 
executive pay and average worker pay, it is not clear that managers benefit from higher pay 
increases more than workers as a whole in managerially-controlled firms, though they do in the 
sample as a whole.  In an earlier study using different data, Werner and Tosi (1995) found that 
managers in management-controlled firms had higher base and total salaries than those in owner-
controlled or owner-managed firms and that differences were most pronounced for higher-level 
managers.  These data also showed that non-managerial employees were not beneficiaries of higher 
salaries in management-controlled firms (Tosi et al., 1999).   
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In an alternative approach using a measure of management discretion not directly linked to 
ownership, Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003) show that protection from takeovers is 
associated with higher levels of employee pay.  They argue that protection from takeovers provides 
managers with greater discretion which they use to raise wages.  They investigated this by 
comparing wages in US states with strong and weak anti-takeover legislation.  After the passage of 
legislation raising the barriers to takeovers (thereby entrenching managers), production workers’ 
wages rise by about 1 per cent and white collar wages by about 4 per cent compared with companies 
in states without such legislation.  They argue that managers use their greater discretion to pursue a 
quiet life rather than empire-building because there is no evidence that managers exploit their 
discretion to open new plants.   
Drawing from a different body of literature on ‘strategic’ HRM, with an emphasis on 
resources and stewardship, Liu et al. (2013) explore the impact of various dimensions of ownership, 
including concentration, on a range of HRM policies.  They use a measure of ‘typical’ pay in the 
workplace rather than employee-level data, incorporating salary (gross annual earnings including 
bonuses) and various benefits into a scale to measure investment in ‘long-term commitment’.   
Greater shareholder concentration is found to be negatively associated with such commitment.  
Similarly Gorton and Schmidt (1999) examine ownership dispersion in Austrian banks, finding that 
ownership dispersion is associated with higher average pay.  They attribute this to efficiency wages 
strategies.   
There are several limitations in the research to date.  With the exception of Cronqvist et al. 
(2009), most studies use a company or workplace-based measure of average pay rather than 
employee-level data.  This has two limitations.  First, worker characteristics cannot be fully 
controlled for, making it difficult to determine whether workers receive higher pay because of an 
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ownership premium, because they are better qualified, or because they are in better-paying 
occupations.  Second, the distribution of higher pay cannot be ascertained when an average measure 
of pay across the workplace is used – making it impossible to determine whether any pay premium 
is distributed equally or concentrated in parts of the pay distribution.  Even where individual-level 
data are used, there are limitations.  Whilst Cronqvist et al. (2009) are able to incorporate data on 
education and tenure into their analysis (finding that together they reduce the CEO discretion effect 
by 1-2 percentage points), they do not utilise data on occupations to explore compositional effects.
4
   
Ideally, examination of ownership effects on pay will use both employee-level and 
workplace or company-level data to enable evaluation of compositional factors and distributional 
issues.  We are fortunate that the WERS survey has rich information on worker characteristics in the 
employee questionnaire, including pay, whilst the workplace questionnaire has extensive 
information on workplace and organisational characteristics. This enables us to evaluate the role of 
worker and workplace characteristics in the relationship between ownership dispersion and pay 
differences.    
  In the remainder of the paper, we report the findings of our analysis of the relationship 
between ownership concentration / dispersion and wages.  To guide the empirical component, we 
pose three questions.    
1. Is there a difference in hourly pay between employees in concentrated and dispersed 
ownership workplaces and, if so, how large is the premium?   
2. How far do pay differences between these two sets of workplaces persist once worker 
characteristics, workforce composition, and workplace characteristics are controlled for?    
3. Are managers the main beneficiaries of any pay premium and what is the distribution of any 
pay premium across the pay spectrum? 
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3.  Data and Methods 
The data source is the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) 2011, a nationally 
representative survey of British public and private sector workplaces with 5 or more employees in 
all sectors  except agriculture and primary industries (Department of Business, Innovation, and 
Skills 2013; van Wanrooy et al. 2013).  The WERS population accounts for one-third of all British 
workplaces and around 90 per cent of employees in 2011.  Earlier versions of this survey have been 
used on a number of occasions to identify influences on employee remuneration (e.g. Forth and 
Millward 2004; McNabb and Whitfield 2000; Pendleton et al. 2009).   
The workplace data are stratified by size category and industry sector, and comprise data 
from 989 workplaces that had also participated in the 2004 survey supplemented by data from 1691 
workplaces selected randomly within each stratum (Deepchand et al. 2013).  The overall response 
rate was 46 per cent.    Data were collected by interview with the most senior manager with 
responsibility for employment relations and personnel in each workplace, and they comprise 
detailed information on workplace employment institutions and practices, along with some 
information on corporate-level characteristics such as organisational size, stock market listing, and 
ownership structure.  These data were supplemented by a questionnaire administered randomly to up 
to 25 employees in each participating workplace (the Employee Questionnaire), with a total number 
of 21,981 respondents.  The latter contains information on weekly pay, hours of work, occupation, 
and personal information on gender, age, education, and tenure.       
The two surveys are linked to examine how corporate and workplace-level phenomena affect 
individual worker pay.  Ownership dispersion is not a relevant consideration in the public sector so 
we drop workers and workplaces in this sector.  The final useable sample of employee respondents 
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is then achieved in several steps.  The number of employees in the non-public sector component of 
the Employee Survey is 13,657, reduced to 12,612 after 1,045 cases with missing values are 
removed.  From the private sector sample we retain those employees in workplaces which are either 
private or public limited companies or limited by guarantee
5
: 3,037 employees in workplaces 
belonging to partnerships, charities, and cooperatives are removed.  With the removal of employees 
belonging to those workplaces with missing values, the final useable sample is 8,727 employees and 
915 workplaces (an average of 9.5 employees per workplace).
6
  The data are weighted to correct for 
sample selection and non-response biases using weights supplied with the WERS data.    
     
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is a measure of gross hourly pay derived from the Employee Survey.  
Employees are asked ‘How much do you get paid for your job here before tax and other deductions?  
If your pay before tax changes from week to week because of overtime, or because you work 
different hours each week, think about what you earn on average’.  Respondents tick one of 14 
boxes containing banded annual pay and its weekly equivalent.  In the descriptive statistics, ordinary 
least squares (OLS), propensity score matching (PSM), and quantile analyses, we divide the mid-
point of each category by the usual hours of work to generate hourly pay.  We set an upper bound of 
1.5 times the lower bound in the top, open-ended category.  In accordance with usual practice, the 
pay figure is then converted into log form.  The reliability of our approach is supported by recent  
work showing very high correlations (0.99) between WERS salary mid-points and means derived 
from actual wage records in the official UK Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings  (Bryson et al., 
2016).  Since actual pay within the categories is unknown, and there is right censoring, we use 
interval regression procedures (Stewart 1983), whereby the lower and upper bounds of each 
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category are divided by hours of work and then converted to log form.  Hourly pay is likely to 
include individual and group incentive pay as these are typically paid as part of weekly or monthly 
earnings.  Although the composition of hourly pay is not observed in the survey, whether individuals 
receive individual or group incentive pay is recorded.
7
 
 
Independent variable 
The independent variable of primary interest is ownership dispersion.  In the Management 
Questionnaire, respondents are asked whether a single individual, family, or investment institution 
owns at least 25 per cent of the company to which the workplace belongs.  If the answer to this is no, 
the variable is coded as 1 = dispersed; if yes, 0 = concentrated ownership.  Table 1 provides details 
on the proportion of employees in each category and average pay for each of them.  Overall, 44 per 
cent of employees are employed in workplaces with dispersed ownership.  The raw pay differential 
between employees in dispersed and concentrated workplaces is 0.3 log points. 
 
- Table 1 about here - 
 
Our choice of ownership measure is driven by the design of the questionnaire.  Nevertheless, 
the 25 per cent dividing line has a good basis in several features of corporate law and actual patterns 
of ownership.  Although the disclosure threshold for ownership of stock market-listed firms is 3 per 
cent in the UK, and is therefore sometimes taken to signify block-holding, 25 per cent is an 
important control threshold in corporate law (bearing in mind also that our interest is not relatively 
large shareholdings as such but the capacity to exercise effective control).  Certain control rights 
come into play at 25 per cent, such as the power to block special resolutions and changes to the 
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constitution of a company.  Other legislation (e.g. that relating to executive and employee share 
ownership schemes) defines 25 per cent ownership as a ‘material interest’ which gives de facto 
powers of control.  Arguably, effective control might be secured at lower levels of ownership, as 
argued in Cubbin and Leach (1983), but in practice 25 per cent appears to be an approximation to 
the point at which effective control is often realised.  Faccio and Lang’s survey of ownership 
patterns in European companies identifies 20 per cent as giving effective control (2002: 369).  
However, for the UK they note that the average ownership of the largest ultimate controlling 
shareholder is 25.1 per cent.   In our sample most stock market listed firms are to be found in the 
dispersed ownership category (Faccio and Lang find that 61 per cent of listed firms have no 
individual block-holders with above 20 per cent ownership), though there is a sizeable minority with 
a 25 per cent plus holding (as also noted in La Porta et al. 1999).  To take account of these 
compositional factors we control for stock market listing in our regressions.  Ideally, other measures 
of capital and ownership structure might also be used, but unfortunately these are not available in 
WERS. 
 
Control variables 
As in previous studies using WERS linked workplace-employee data, an extensive range of controls 
can be included for demographic, job, and workplace characteristics (e.g. Bryson et al. 2004).  The 
demographic controls include dummies for gender, age, ethnicity
8
, marital status, dependent 
children, qualifications, and trade union membership.  Whether individual employees receive 
individual performance-pay, group performance pay, and/or profit sharing is also recorded.  Given 
that individual and group performance pay are typically paid regularly as a supplement to base pay, 
payments from these schemes are likely to be incorporated in employees’ reports of their wages or 
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salaries (i.e. the dependent variable).  By contrast, profit sharing is typically paid annually and hence 
is unlikely to be incorporated in the main pay measure.
9
  Unfortunately, WERS reports only the 
receipt of payments from these schemes, not the actual amounts.  Thus, these controls take the form 
of dummies, taking the value 1 where employees receive such payments.  Corporate governance 
theory suggests that incentive pay may be determined by the ownership structure, but this applies 
mainly to owner-executive relationships rather than manager-worker pay-setting.  It is true that the 
various forms of incentives are more common for workers where ownership is dispersed (see Table 
2), but we control for performance pay in our regression and matching estimates.      
Dummies are also included for occupation (based on the 2000 Standard Occupational 
Classification), tenure, and the permanence of the employment contract.   Workplace controls 
include a set of dummies for organizational size, a continuous measure for workplace employee 
numbers, dummies for industry sector (based on the 2007 Standard Industrial Classification), and 
dummies for geographic region.  Controls are also included for stock market listing (see above) and 
foreign ownership.  Finally, the regressions incorporate a dummy for whether workplace 
productivity is better than that in similar workplaces: the question, widely used in studies of 
performance using WERS (e.g. Addison and Belfield 2001) asks whether productivity is better or 
worse than in similar workplaces in the same industry, with answers ranging from ‘a lot below’ to ‘a 
lot above’.  This variable is coded as 1 if the respondent answers ‘above’ or ‘a lot above’, 0 
otherwise. 
- Table 2 about here - 
 
Analytical strategy 
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Workplace and individual data are linked, and analysis conducted using the complex surveys 
procedures in Stata.  We use the employee weights supplied with the WERS data.   We conduct a 
series of Interval Regression analyses, supplemented by an OLS analysis for comparator purposes, 
with log hourly pay as the dependent variable.  Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at 
workplace level are used to control for cross-correlation between workers in the same workplace.  In 
these procedures, we first generate a raw correlation coefficient for the relationship between 
ownership dispersion and pay without any other variables in the model (Table 3, Model 1).  Then we 
present a Mincerian-type wage equation conditioning on a set of human capital characteristics, such 
as education, age, and experience (Model 2).  Next, a range of workplace and company 
characteristics are added (Model 3).  Separate models are subsequently run for men and women 
(Models 4 and 5).  Model 6 utilises OLS to provide a comparison.   
We supplement these regression-based estimates with propensity score matching (PSM) 
using the kernel estimator.  Like regression techniques, PSM assumes that non-random exposure to 
dispersed ownership is accounted for by observable features of the worker and workplace which 
capture the selection process. However, PSM matches employees exposed to dispersed ownership 
with observationally equivalent employees exposed to concentrated ownership via a matching 
weight which establishes the distance between ‘treated’ cases - in our case, those exposed to 
dispersed ownership - and ‘control’ cases which are not.  With these weights PSM ensures ‘control’ 
cases are observationally similar in their mean characteristics to ‘treated’ cases.  Where ‘treated’ 
cases lack similar counterfactuals, they are said to be ‘off common support’ and, as such, are 
dropped from the analysis (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).    This procedure then reports the Average 
Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) i.e. the effect of dispersed ownership on the wages of those 
who are exposed to dispersed ownership, compared with counterfactual employees who are not.  
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The matching weights are derived from probit regressions estimating the likelihood of being 
exposed to dispersed ownership.  These can be found in Appendix A, whilst the ATT coefficients 
and bootstrapped standard errors are reported in Table 4 (see Bryson et al. 2002 for more details on 
implementing matching procedures).      
 Finally, we conduct a quantile regression to analyse the dispersed ownership premium 
across the pay distribution.  This enables us to determine whether any pay premium is higher at the 
upper end of the wage distribution, as shown by other studies.  To provide robustness checks, we 
compare the effect of ownership dispersion on managerial pay against that of other occupations and 
also restrict the analysis to the top two pay categories. 
 
4.  Results 
Ownership and average hourly pay 
Table 3 shows the results where hourly pay is regressed against dispersed ownership, with the 
addition consecutively of demographic, job, and workplace characteristics.  The key result is that 
there are strong positive relationships between ownership dispersion and employee remuneration, 
even after the insertion of an extensive set of controls.   
 
- Table 3 about here - 
 
In Model 1 only the measure for dispersed ownership is included.  The coefficient is positive, 
sizeable (0.30), and statistically significant (at p < 0.01per cent).  Table 1 has already shown that the 
mean of log hourly pay in dispersed ownership workplaces is 2.54 compared with 2.24 in 
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concentrated ownership workplaces.  The difference in log hourly wages equates to a 35 percent 
difference in average hourly pay.   
 Model 2 adds demographic and job characteristics.  The dispersed ownership coefficient 
reduces in magnitude, but remains sizeable and significant, indicating that dispersed ownership 
increases hourly wages by 0.13 log points once controls are added.  Worker and job characteristics 
account for about 60 per cent of the overall difference in average hourly pay between employees in 
these two sets of workplaces.  Other variables behave as expected.  Age has a strong negative effect 
for younger workers compared with the reference category (30-39 years).  Longer tenure has a 
significant positive effect.  The various dummies for qualifications also have significant positive 
effects, with effect size tending to increase with qualification level (apart from at the lower end).  
For occupational type (managers is the reference category), all but one of the coefficients on the 
occupational dummies are negative and significant.  Receipt of various forms of performance pay is 
associated with higher hourly earnings, as found in Bryson et al. (2016), though we cannot 
determine the precise contribution of performance pay to the ownership pay premium because of 
data limitations.  
 Model 3 adds workplace and organisational controls, including industry and location 
dummies.  Although the size of the dispersed coefficient reduces, it nevertheless continues to exert a 
positive and significant effect on hourly wages (just under 8 per cent at p < 0.01).  Most of these 
organisational variables have the expected signs.  Establishment size is associated with higher pay, 
as is typically found in the literature (Brown and Medoff 1989), though the effect is very small.  
However, company size has no significant independent effect on wages, other than for the lowest 
size above the reference category.  Foreign ownership has a significant positive effect, consistent 
with prior literature (Conyon et al. 2002).  Stock market listing, however, does not.  This may reflect 
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two opposing forces.  On the one hand, the tendency for stock market firms to have dispersed 
ownership may favour higher pay, for the reasons outlined in this paper.  On the other, the market 
for corporate control (to which listed firms have greater exposure) may depress employee pay, as 
suggested by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Gospel and Pendleton (2003).  Results were 
unaffected by the removal of workplaces in firms with a stock market listing: the dispersed 
ownership coefficient for this sub-group of non-listed workplaces was 0.085 (standard error = 0.026). 
Finally, one might be concerned that workplace productivity and incentive pay schemes might 
remove some of the effect of dispersed ownership.  We tested the sensitivity of our estimates to their 
removal: once excluded, the dispersed ownership coefficient remains very similar (0.084, standard 
error = 0.025).  
Models 4 and 5 restrict the sample to women and men respectively, whilst controlling for all 
of the demographic, job, and workplace characteristics in Model 3.  Differences between the sexes 
are small, with the dispersed coefficient being just 7.1 in the case of men and 5.9 per cent in that of 
women.  Whilst women on average are paid less than men, as shown by the significant negative 
coefficients in Models 2 and 3, dispersed ownership has similar effects on the hourly pay of both 
sexes.  Finally, Model 6 adds an OLS model as a check on the interval regression estimates.  The 
dispersed ownership coefficient is almost identical to that in Model 3. The explanatory power of the 
full model with all controls is shown by the change in model fit from an adjusted r
2 
 of 0.058 in 
Model 1 to 0.496 in Model 6. 
To summarise, there is a sizeable difference in average hourly pay between dispersed and 
concentrated workplaces.  Much of this is explained by differences in workforce composition, 
worker quality (qualifications, tenure, occupational type), receipt of performance pay, and 
workplace characteristics (establishment size, foreign ownership).  Nevertheless, there is an 
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unexplained element (just under one-quarter) of the pay difference between workers employed in 
dispersed and concentrated workplaces.  Prevailing explanations in the literature for this premium 
emphasise managers’ exploitation of weak owner control to pursue their own interests.  Cronqvist et 
al. (2009) use an association between the presence of unions judged to be strong and aggressive and 
the dispersed ownership premium to argue that managers use their discretion to have a quiet life by 
‘buying off’ these unions with higher pay.  Although being a union member is associated with a 
significantly higher probability of being in a dispersed ownership workplace (see Appendix A1), the 
coefficients for union membership in Table 3 are uniformly insignificant.  We pursue this further by 
re-running Model 3 with a further dummy for union recognition for pay determination (not shown, 
but available on request).  This, however, has an almost nil effect on the pay premium.  Further 
exploration using an interaction of union recognition and dispersed ownership also generates a tiny 
and insignificant coefficient, suggesting that securing a quiet life in relation to unions is not a factor 
explaining the ownership premium. 
In Table 4 we match employees in dispersed ownership workplaces with those in 
concentrated ownership workplaces using matching weights as discussed in Section 3.  This 
procedure is used for the sample as a whole and for the male and female sub-samples.  The probits 
generated during the matching process can be found in Appendix A whilst the ATT results are in 
Table 4 
 
- Table 4 about here - 
 
The matching estimates are a little larger than those obtained from the regression analyses in 
Table 3:  the ATT coefficient is just over 10 per cent compared with just under 8 per cent for the full 
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model in Table 3.  The ATT coefficients are of a similar magnitude in the male and female sub-
samples.      
 
Who benefits from dispersed ownership?   
We turn next to the important issue of whether the pay premium is found across the pay distribution.  
Who are the beneficiaries of higher pay in dispersed ownership workplaces?  Is it those at the top or 
are the benefits spread to other groups of employees?  This is in the context of the fact that previous 
research has shown that higher level employees, especially those at the top of corporate hierarchies, 
benefit more from managerial discretion than other employees (Cronqvist et al. 2009; Tosi et al. 
1999).       
 To examine this, Table 5 presents results for a quantile regression, using the same model 
specification as in column 3 of Table 3, with results reported for the 25
th
, 50
th
, and 75
th 
quantiles, 
supplemented with those for the 5
th
 and 95
th 
percentile.  
 
- Table 5 about here - 
 
The results in Table 5, Panel A are striking.  When we enter only the dispersed ownership 
dummy with no controls, there is a wage gap between those in dispersed ownership workplaces 
relative to those who are not across most of the pay distribution, but the effect halves between the 
75
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles.  However, once we condition on the full range of controls, the coefficients 
on dispersed ownership fall markedly, but are roughly constant across most of the pay distribution, 
ranging from 0.076 log points at the 5
th
 percentile to 0.071 at the 75
th
.  The coefficient is significant 
at p<0.001 in each case.  At the 95
th
 percentile, however, the coefficient is somewhat smaller (0.053) 
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and not significant.  It should be noted that the model fit at the 95th percentile drops, and some other 
variables that are significant lower down the distribution are also non-significant at the 95th 
percentile, including  worker qualifications, job tenure, and establishment size.  It is therefore harder 
to identify influences on pay at the highest point in the wage distribution.   Nevertheless, those at the 
top, whether in dispersed or concentrated workplaces, benefit from substantially higher hourly pay: 
note that there is a larger proportional increase in the constant between the 75
th
 and 95
th
 percentile 
compared with those between other quantiles (except the 5
th
 and 25
th
). 
As a robustness check on these results, we split the sample between managers, who are likely 
to be more concentrated at the upper end of the pay distribution, and other employees.  The results 
are reported in Table 5, Panel B.  Although managers in dispersed ownership workplaces have a raw 
pay premium that is similar to non-managers, the coefficient becomes half the size of that for non-
managers and is not significant at p< 0.05 once the full range of controls are included.  Ideally, 
occupational-level analysis would be developed further, but small sample sizes severely limit the 
value of this.  As a further check, we restrict the sample to the top two pay categories and re-run the 
interval regression with the full range of controls.  Here again, the coefficient on dispersed 
ownership is non-significant, indicating that those at the upper end of the pay distribution do not 
benefit from a dispersed ownership pay premium.    
Thus, contrary to the previous literature, the pecuniary returns to dispersed ownership accrue 
more to workers other than managers and the highest paid.  Our results therefore contrast with those 
other studies which find that managers exploit discretion to benefit themselves more than other 
employees (Cronqvist et al. 2009; Tosi et al. 1999).       
   
5. Discussion and Conclusions  
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This paper has compared pay in concentrated and dispersed ownership workplaces.  As in Cronqvist 
et al. (2009), it finds that ownership dispersion is associated with higher levels of pay.  Even after 
controlling for demographic, job, and workplace characteristics, ownership dispersion correlates 
with higher hourly pay.  Around three-quarters of the 0.3 log point raw pay difference between 
employees in dispersed and concentrated ownership workplaces is explained by  employee 
characteristics (e.g. qualifications), job characteristics (e.g. occupation and tenure), and workplace 
characteristics (e.g. size).  Even so, around a quarter of the pay differential is unexplained by these 
other characteristics.   After inclusion of these controls, the ownership dispersion premium is around 
0.07 log points, similar to other recent work (Cronqvist et al. 2009).   The pay differential is even 
higher when any selection bias is controlled for by workplace matching.  
A novelty of the paper is that we examine pay differences at various points of the pay 
distribution.  Earlier research has been limited in this respect.  Surprisingly, given the prevailing 
finding in the literature that top managers benefit more than others from ownership dispersion, the 
size of the pay differential is more or less the same across most of the distribution, but with a 
smaller and insignificant ownership coefficient at the 95
th
 percentile (where many managers are 
found).  A direct comparison of the pay premia for managers and non-managers also finds that the 
dispersed ownership pay gap is smaller and insignificant for managers.    
Several explanations for a dispersed ownership premium were mooted earlier in the paper.  
One possibility raised in the literature is that high wages are an indirect effect of ‘empire building’ 
where ownership is dispersed.  Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) discount this explanation based on 
data on plant births and deaths over several years.  Unfortunately, we are not able to mount a similar 
test for data availability reasons.  It is undoubtedly true that dispersed ownership is associated with 
larger organisational size (see the probits in Appendix A) but we cannot assess whether this is the 
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outcome of ‘empire building’.   Another posited explanation suggests that high pay may help to 
insulate managers from takeovers.  Once again, we cannot fully test this explanation due to data 
limitations, but it is worth noting that the coefficient for the listed companies’ dummy (i.e. those 
workplaces which are most exposed to the market for corporate control) has an insignificant 
relationship with pay levels.  Moreover, interacting dispersed ownership with listed company status 
generates an insignificant interaction term, whilst leaving the base coefficients more or less 
unchanged.  We conclude therefore that the dispersed ownership effect is not moderated by a listed 
company effect and, on the basis of this, that protection from takeovers is unlikely to be a reason for 
higher wages.  
A major issue concerns whether managers with discretion from owners will pursue self-
interested or enlightened managerial policies.  A principal-agent perspective highlights the pursuit of 
self-interest where monitoring is weak, whereas the implication of ‘strategic’ or ‘enlightened’ HRM 
perspectives is that managers will implement policies for the good of the firm and its employees 
when given the opportunity to do so.  One of the problems here is that it is not possible to determine 
whether managerial motives are influenced by a self-interested desire for a quiet life, or altruism, or 
possibly both, because WERS lacks data on managerial intentionality.   The absence of a significant 
pay premium for managers could be consistent with both altruism and an opportunistic pursuit of 
non-pecuniary benefits such as a quiet life.    
In line with more ‘enlightened’ motives, some earlier accounts have proposed an efficiency 
wages explanation for pay differences (e.g. Gorton and Schmidt 1999).  However, our evidence does 
not support this.  Workplace productivity does not affect the pay premium, and the probits show that 
the productivity differences between dispersed and concentrated ownership workplaces are 
negligible.  Furthermore, we find no evidence that workplace productivity moderates the dispersed 
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ownership effect on pay.   Whilst there is some evidence of a higher level of qualifications amongst 
employees in dispersed ownership workplaces, this effect is fully controlled for in the main 
regressions in Table 3.  Meanwhile, there is no difference in tenure between employees in the two 
types of workplace (see Appendix A).  Given the absence of  empirical support for efficiency 
explanations of the pay premium, corporate governance theory inclines us  towards the more self-
interested explanations associated with the ‘quiet life’ perspective (as found in Cronqvist et al. 
(2009) and Bertrand and Mullanaithan 2003).  However, unlike Cronqvist et al., we find no 
evidence that union pressure is a factor behind the observed pay premia and therefore conclude that 
a desire for an easy time in dealings with unions is not an important motive for higher pay.    
 That pay differs between workplaces and firms for otherwise similar jobs is a very well-
established finding in Industrial Relations and Labour Economics, as noted earlier in the paper.  For 
the most part, earlier work has emphasized the role of labour or product markets and their 
imperfections.  The novelty of our paper is that it shows that ownership structure is a highly relevant 
factor for understanding how variations in workers’ pay come to be realised, and that ownership 
should therefore be added to product and labour market forces as influences upon managerial 
decisions.   Where managers have more discretion to run the firm or workplace, relative to owners, 
pay outcomes tend to be better for workers.  Our findings support the contention, therefore, that an 
understanding of corporate ownership and governance has much to offer the study of work and 
employment.  The demise of firms that typically have dispersed ownership (Davis 2016), and the 
emergence of new forms of concentrated ownership, such as private equity (see Gospel et al. 2014) 
may not bode well for workers’ pay.   
 We note several limitations in our study.  First, the measure of ownership dispersion in 
WERS is blunt: some may question whether 25 per cent is an appropriate separation point between 
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concentrated and dispersed ownership.  Data availability drives our usage of this particular measure.  
Nevertheless, as argued earlier, it has a basis in the literature on ownership structure, where 20-25 
per cent appears to be a key threshold for control.  A related limitation is that we know little about 
the characteristics of owners.  Recent studies have drawn attention to differences between 
‘committed’ and ‘transient’ owners, finding that pay dispersion between managers and workers is 
higher where owners have a short-term orientation (Connelly et al. 2013).  Unfortunately, limited 
information on owner identity in WERS does not allow us to pursue this line of analysis.  Nor can 
we explore the role of other dimensions of ownership and governance since the data-set lacks the 
relevant information and it is not feasible to link it to other relevant data sources. 
 Second, the cross-sectional character of the study is an obvious limitation.  A longitudinal 
panel would enable greater attention to selection, causality, and the potential endogeneity of 
ownership.  Unfortunately, the WERS panel does not contain an ownership measure, and the 
ownership question in earlier versions of WERS is not comparable to that used here
10
.  However, the 
evidence in the paper suggests that endogeneity is not a major problem.  The most obvious factor 
relating to selection effects and endogeneity is organisational size given that larger companies are 
more likely to pay high wages (Brown and Medoff 1989) and to select into dispersed ownership.  
However, we are struck by the insignificance of most of the organisational size dummies.  Even if 
high wage workplaces ‘select’ into dispersed ownership because concentrated owners wish to avoid 
obligations to pay high wages, this is consistent with our primary argument that ownership 
dispersion is associated with differential wage levels.  Within the constraints of cross-sectional data, 
the PSM analysis shows that the ownership premium persists when we match workers according to 
their individual and workplace characteristics.  Nevertheless, it would be interesting to consider 
cases where concentrated owners (e.g. private equity) acquire high wage workplaces with a view to 
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bringing managers and pay under greater control.  Unfortunately, WERS does not have the relevant 
data to consider this particular issue.  
Third, we lack data on managerial motivations, something we share with every other study 
on this topic.  Is the unexplained pay gap due to management self-interest, as in principal-agent 
perspectives, or more altruistic conceptions of organisational stewardship (as in Donaldson and 
Davis 1991), or perhaps even both?  The explained part of the pay gap may arise from enlightened 
managerial practices, such as a concern to develop high levels of human capital or to share profits 
with employees, but it is also true that more qualified workers facilitate a quieter life.  The emphasis 
on ‘objective’ features of employment and industrial relations practices in WERS precludes 
questioning on these more ‘subjective’ aspects of management practice.  Unfortunately, to develop 
robust measures of managerial intentionality would require major changes in the design of WERS. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this paper has demonstrated links between ownership and 
employee pay.   It is clear that pay is higher in dispersed workplaces, even after controlling for an 
extensive range of worker and workplace characteristics.  Moreover, the pay premium is found 
across most of the pay distribution.  
The results suggest a number of opportunities for further research.   First, using the WERS 
data, it would be interesting to explore other possible labour outcomes of ownership concentration / 
dispersion, such as effects on work organization and voice arrangements.  Second, it would be 
useful to identify other data sources, public and private, which might provide more data on 
ownership and pay.   Ideally such data should also be longitudinal so as to shed more light on 
causality.  However, the ability to match these with WERS will be limited and such sources will not 
have the detail on employment matters contained in WERS.  Third, it would be useful to examine 
the situation in other countries, in so far as similar data exist.  Thus, it is well known that there is 
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more concentrated ownership in much of continental Europe and it would be interesting to see 
whether this has the same restraining effect on pay. 
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Table 1. Proportion of employees and pay levels in each ownership category 
 
 
 Dispersed ownership Concentrated ownership 
Proportion of employees (% of 
survey weighted sample) 
43.42 56.58 
Proportion of workplaces (% of 
survey weighted sample) 
25.87 74.13 
Average gross hourly pay £15.94 £11.84 
Mean of log hourly pay 2.54 2.24 
Mean of log hourly pay: males  2.63 2.36 
Mean of log hourly pay: 
females  
2.39 2.11 
 
n = 8727
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Table 2.  Variable descriptions and summary statistics  
Variable name Variable description Means 
 
Correla-
tion with 
hourly 
pay 
  All Dispe-
rsed 
Concen-
trated 
 
Dependent 
variable 
     
Hourly pay Log of average weekly pay divided by usual 
hours of work (using mid-points of 14 pay 
bands).   
2.372 2.543 2.241 1 
Independent 
variables 
     
Dispersed 
ownership 
= 1 if employed in a workplace that does 
 not have an owner with a >25% stake. 
0.434 1 0 0.242 
Demographic 
characteristics 
     
Male = 1 if male 0.449 0.404 0.480 -0.181 
Age under 20 = 1 if aged under 20.  0.028 0.011 0.040 -0.216 
Age 20-29 = 1 if aged 20-29 0.228 0.220 0.233 -0.174 
Age 30-39 = 0 if aged 30-39.  Reference category 0.240 0.248 0.234 - 
Age 40-49 = 1 if aged 40-49 0.244 0.263 0.230 0.125 
Age 50-59 = 1 if aged 50-59 0.193 0.201 0.189 0.026 
Age 60+ = 1 if age 60 and over 0.067 0.057 0.074 -0.036 
Ethnicity  = 1 if white British 0.962 0.939 0.980 -0.011 
Married = 1 if married 0.668 0.686 0.654 0.206 
Dependents = 1 if any dependent children 0.348 0.368 0.332 0.160 
Disabled = 1 if has long-term limiting health 
problem or disability 
0.078 0.075 0.080 -0.048 
Qualification: 
none 
= 0 if no academic qualifications.   
Reference category 
0.184 0.147 0.212 - 
Qualification: 
Other 
= 1 if ‘other’ is highest academic  
Qualification 
0.037 0.040 0.035 -0.066 
Qualification: 
CSE 
= 1 if CSE or equivalent is highest academic  
   Qualification 
0.101 0.088 0.111 -0.066 
Qualification: 
O-Level 
= 1 if O-Level or equivalent is highest 
qualification 
0.270 0.227 0.304 -0.067 
Qualification: 1 
A-Level 
= 1 if 1 A-Level or equivalent is highest 
qualification 
0.037 0.031 0.041 -0.023 
Qualification: 2 
A-Levels 
= 1 if 2 or more A-Levels is highest 
qualification 
0.082 0.084 0.080 -0.029 
Qualification: 
degree 
= 1 if degree or equivalent is highest 
qualification 
0.213 0.271 0.169 0.246 
Qualification: 
postgraduate 
= 1 if highest qualification is post-graduate 
 or equivalent 
0.076 0.112 0.048 0.213 
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Union = 1 if employee is a member of a trade union 0.165 0.228 0.116 0.017 
Job 
characteristics 
     
Manager = 0 if employee is a manager or senior 
 official   Reference category 
0.127 0.123 0.132 - 
Professional =1 if employee is a professional 0.141 0193 0.100 0.301 
Associate 
Professional 
=1 if employee is in an associate 
 professional or technical occupation 
0.167 0.206 0.138 0.215 
Administration =1 if employee is in an administrative or 
secretarial occupation 
0.134 0.125 0.141 -0.074 
Skilled = 1 if employee is in a skilled trade 0.086 0.071 0.097 -0.025 
Caring = 1 if employee is in a personal service 
occupation 
0.048 0.041 0.052 -0.184 
Sales = 1 if employee is in a sales or customer 
service occupation 
0.099 0.057 0.132 -0.236 
Operative = 1 if employee is a process, plant or 
 machine operative  
0.089 0.089 0.089 -0.105 
Routine = 1 if employee is in a routine occupation 0.109 0.095 0.119 -0.247 
Tenure <1 years = 0 if tenure is under 1 year.  Reference 
category 
   - 
Tenure >1 year = 1 if tenure is one year or more but less than 
two years 
0.121 0.118 0.123 -0.050 
Tenure >2 years = 1 if tenure is two or more years but less than  
five years 
0.262 0.240 0.278 -0.051 
Tenure >5 years = 1 if tenure is five or more years but less than 
ten years 
0.238 0.244 0.234 0.060 
Tenure >10 
years 
= 1 if tenure is 10 years or more 0.230 0.249 0.215 0.119 
Temporary 
contract 
= 1 if on temporary contract 0.034 0.024 0.042 -0.154 
Fixed-term 
contract 
= 1 if on fixed term contract 0.019 0.027 0.012 -0.034 
Individual PBR = 1 if receives individual payment by results 0.169 0.208 0.139 0.237 
Group PBR = 1 if receives group payment by results 0.109 0.150 0.077 0.205 
Profit sharing = 1 if receives profit sharing 0.161 0.224 0.113 0.335 
Workplace 
characteristics 
     
Stock market  = 1 if belongs to stock market listed company 0.213 0.310 0.139 0.030 
Foreign = 1 if owned by foreign company 0.218 0.322 0.137 0.214 
Size = 0 if company has less than 100 employees.        
   Reference category 
0.304 0.146 0.425 - 
Size (100-999)  = 1 if company has 100 - 999 employees 0.230 0.211 0.244 0.056 
Size (1,000 – 
9,999)  
= 1 if company has 1,000 – 9,999 employees 0.268 0.369 0.192 0.094 
Size (10,000 +) = 1 if company has 10,000 or more employees 0.198 0.274 0.139 -0.079 
Establishment 
size 
Number of employees in establishment 
(continuous)   
477 853 188 0.180 
Productivity = 1 if workplace productivity is better than 0.618 0.663 0.584 -0.008 
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average for similar workplaces in the same 
industry 
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Table 3: The influence of ownership dispersion on hourly pay    
Interval regressions: coefficients (linearized standard errors) 
 
 Hourly pay  
 
Model 1 
(OLS) 
Hourly pay  
 
Model 2  
Hourly pay  
 
Model 3 
Hourly pay: 
women 
Model 4  
Hourly pay: 
men 
Model 5 
Hourly pay  
 
Model 6 
(OLS) 
Dispersed 
ownership 
0.301 
(0.043)*** 
0.125 
(0.025)*** 
0.079 
(0.024)*** 
0.059 
(0.024)** 
0.071 
(0.030)* 
0.075  
(0.022)*** 
Demographic 
characteristics 
      
Male  -0.153 
(0.020)*** 
-0.126 
(0.021)*** 
- - -0.115 
 (0.018)*** 
Age under 20  -0.410  
(0.048)*** 
-0.371 
(0.052)*** 
-0.314 
(0.055)*** 
-0.473 
(0.072)*** 
-0.309  
(0.052)*** 
Age 20-29  -0.175  
(0.025)*** 
-0.153 
(0.021)*** 
-0.151 
(0.026)*** 
-0.173 
(0.035)*** 
-0.159  
(0.022)*** 
Age 40-49  0.052  
(0.026) 
0.060 
(0.028)* 
0.010 
(0.031) 
0.079 
(0.036) 
0.041 
(0.024) 
Age 50-59  0.029 
(0.025) 
0.023 
(0.027) 
-0.041 
(0.036) 
0.058 
(0.033) 
0.011 
 (0.024) 
Age 60+  0.025  
(0.035) 
0.022 
(0.038) 
-0.041 
(0.042) 
0.078 
(0.047) 
0.016  
(0.034) 
Ethnicity   0.035  
(0.031) 
0.109 
(0.030)*** 
0.045 
(0.041) 
0.120 
(0.035)** 
0.076  
(0.026)** 
Married  0.074  
(0.017)*** 
0.074 
(0.018)*** 
0.050 
(0.020)* 
0.078 
(0.022)*** 
0.067  
(0.016)*** 
Dependents  0.020  
(0.017) 
0.003 
(0.017) 
-0.004 
(0.023) 
0.028 
(0.021) 
0.015  
(0.015) 
Disabled  -0.027  
(0.023) 
-0.033 
(0.023) 
0.003 
(0.030) 
-0.058 
(0.033) 
-0.023  
(0.022) 
Qualification: 
others 
 0.032  
(0.042) 
0.034 
(0.038) 
-0.033 
(0.047) 
0.079 
(0.048) 
0.024 
(0.037) 
Qualification: CSE  0.137  
(0.029)*** 
0.146 
(0.029)*** 
0.128 
(0.040)** 
0.139 
(0.035)*** 
0.131  
(0.028)*** 
Qualification: O-
Level 
 0.121  
(0.023)*** 
0.125 
(0.025)*** 
0.095 
(0.028)*** 
0.119 
(0.033)*** 
0.106  
(0.023)*** 
Qualification: 1 A-
Level 
 0.113  
(0.038** 
0.120 
(0.036)*** 
0.101 
(0.064) 
0.145 
(0.044)** 
0.119  
(0.035** 
Qualification: 2 A-
Levels 
 0.165  
(0.031)*** 
0.164 
(0.032)*** 
0.136 
(0.040)** 
0.151 
(0.043)*** 
0.140  
(0.030)*** 
Qualification: 
degree7 
 0.282  
(0.032)*** 
0.280 
(0.032)*** 
0.209 
(0.033)*** 
0.275 
(0.043)*** 
0.235  
(0.030)*** 
Qualification: 
postgraduate 
 0.367  
(0.053)*** 
0.356 
(0.054)*** 
0.308 
(0.062)*** 
0.329 
(0.072)*** 
0.287  
(0.046)*** 
Union  0.022  
(0.020) 
0.004 
(0.023) 
0.057 
(0.034) 
0.003 
(0.026) 
0.023 
(0.021) 
Job characteristics       
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Professional  0.010 
(0.051) 
-0.065 
(0.049) 
0.013 
(0.057) 
-0.085 
(0.062) 
-0.040  
(0.042) 
Associate 
Professional 
 -0.079  
(0.046) 
-0.126 
(0.045)*** 
-0.131 
(0.048)** 
-0.128 
(0.053)* 
-0.115  
(0.038)** 
Administration  -0.309  
(0.047)*** 
-0.369 
(0.045)*** 
-0.273 
(0.053)*** 
-0.458 
(0.056)*** 
-0.342  
(0.040)*** 
Skilled  -0.321  
(0.046)*** 
-0.303 
(0.043)*** 
-0.383 
(0.075)*** 
-0.328 
(0.049)*** 
-0.304  
(0.039)*** 
Caring  -0.598  
(0.050)*** 
-0.607 
(0.052)*** 
-0.547 
(0.059)*** 
-0.653 
(0.068)*** 
-0.579  
(0.048)*** 
Sales  -0.540  
(0.049)*** 
-0.529 
(0.050)*** 
-0.471 
(0.052)*** 
-0.476 
(0.076)*** 
-0.497  
(0.047)*** 
Operative  -0.468  
(0.049)*** 
-0.476 
(0.048)*** 
-0.502 
(0.065)*** 
-0.487 
(0.053)*** 
-0.459  
(0.043)*** 
Routine  -0.573  
(0.046)*** 
-0.560 
(0.045)*** 
-0.480 
(0.052)*** 
-0.580 
(0.053)*** 
-0.537  
(0.041)*** 
Tenure > 1 years  0.048  
(0.033) 
0.068 
(0.033)* 
0.024 
(0.033) 
0.049 
(0.045) 
0.050  
(0.030) 
Tenure > 2 years  0.043  
(0.030) 
0.069 
(0.032)* 
0.009 
(0.027) 
0.074 
(0.044) 
0.058  
(0.030)* 
Tenure > 5 years  0.073  
(0.033)* 
0.097 
(0.032)** 
0.027 
(0.029) 
0.102 
(0.045)** 
0.085  
(0.030)** 
Tenure > 10 years  0.138  
(0.034)*** 
0.161 
(0.033)*** 
0.110 
(0.036)** 
0.148 
(0.044)*** 
0.135  
(0.030)*** 
Temporary 
contract 
 -0.169  
(0.043)*** 
-0.153 
(0.044)*** 
-0.171 
(0.052)** 
-0.097 
(0.054)* 
-0.107  
(0.037)** 
Fixed term contract  -0.091  
(0.041)* 
-0.104 
(0.033)** 
-0.078 
(0.045)* 
-0.096 
(0.046)* 
-0.092 
(0.033)** 
Individual PBR  0.155  
(0.029)*** 
0.127 
(0.025)*** 
0.120 
(0.033)*** 
0.124) 
(0.030)*** 
0.101 
(0.022)*** 
Group PBR  0.098  
(0.033)** 
0.078 
(0.036)* 
0.128 
(0.039)*** 
0.035 
(0.047) 
0.058  
(0.028)* 
Profit sharing  0.195  
(0.032)*** 
0.168 
(0.031)*** 
0.076 
(0.045) 
0.203 
(0.039)*** 
0.144  
(0.028)*** 
Workplace 
characteristics 
      
Stock market   0.020 
(0.026) 
-0.004 
(0.031) 
0.050 
(0.031) 
 
0.031 
(0.023) 
Foreign   0.119 
(0.029)*** 
0.124 
(0.032)*** 
0.091 
(0.031)** 
0.102 
(0.025)*** 
Size (100 – 999)   0.051 
(0.030) 
0.019 
(0.031) 
0.073 
(0.038)* 
0.047 
(0.027) 
Size (1,000 – 
9,999) 
  0.032 
(0.031) 
-0.013 
(0.031) 
0.068 
(0.037) 
0.023 
(0.027) 
Size (10,000+)   -0.017 
(0.037) 
-0.051 
(0.038) 
0.024 
(0.047) 
-0.024 
(0.033) 
Establishment size   0.000 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
(0.000)*** 
0.000 
(0.000)* 
0.000 
(0.000)*** 
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Productivity    0.005 
(0.020) 
-0.036 
(0.022) 
0.024 
(0.026) 
-0.001 
(0.018) 
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant  2.329 
(0.066)*** 
2.224 
(0.075)*** 
2.292 
(0.092)*** 
1.988 
(0.097)*** 
2.239 
 (0.073)*** 
       
N 8727 8727 8727 3924 4831 8727 
PSU 915 915 915 813 787 915 
R
2
 0.058     0.496 
LR chi square  58.97*** 40.85*** 29.10*** 31.38***  
 
Notes: * = significant at 95 per cent: ** = significant at 99 per cent; *** = significant at 99.9 per cent 
   
The Stata output includes regression results for missing values of various variables so as to maintain sample size.  These 
are not reported above.  
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Table 4 Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
 
Propensity Score Matching using Kernel matching 
 
 
 Whole sample Males only Females only 
ATT coefficient 0.103 0.100 0.085 
Bootstrapped standard 
errors 
0.017*** 0.017*** 0.027** 
N 8694 4815 3907 
Cases off-support 54 58 26 
 
 
Notes:  * = significant at 95 per cent; *** = significant at 99.9 per cent.   
 Kernel uses a normal distribution:  bandwidth = 0.06.  
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Table 5. Dispersed ownership and pay across the pay distribution 
 
Panel A Quantile regression 
 
 
 5%  25% 50% 75% 95% 
Dispersed 
ownership 
(no controls) 
0.170 
(0.028)*** 
0.250 
(0.011)*** 
0.294 
(0.019)*** 
0.377 
(0.022)*** 
0.198 
(0.033)*** 
Constant 1.459*** 1.848*** 2.167*** 2.535*** 3.269*** 
N 8478 8478 8478 8478 8478 
Pseudo R
2
 0.013 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.007 
      
Dispersed 
ownership 
(with full 
controls) 
0.076 
(0.019)*** 
0.067 
(0.011)*** 
0.073 
(0.001)*** 
0.071 
(0.011)*** 
0.053 
(0.039) 
Constant 1.491 
(0.077)*** 
1.888 
(0.044)*** 
2.120 
(0.050)*** 
2.343 
(0.055)*** 
3.405 
(0.183)*** 
N 8478 8478 8478 8478 8478 
Pseudo R
2
 0.329 0.370 0.388 0.369 0.173 
 
Notes:  *** = significant at 99.9 per cent.   
 
Quantiles are estimated simultaneously using the STATA routine sqreg. The full model contains the full set of 
demographic, job, workplace, industry and location controls as in Table 3.  Dependent variable = log hourly pay.  
Coefficients (with bootstrapped standard errors) are reported 
 
 
 
Panel B  Comparison of managers and non-managers 
 
Interval regressions 
 
 
 Managers Non-managers Top 2 pay 
categories 
Dispersed 
ownership (no 
controls) 
0.229* 0.313***  0.027  
Dispersed 
ownership (with 
full controls) 
0.042 0.081*** 0.014  
N 806 7921 1103 
 
 
Notes:  * = significant at 95 per cent; *** = significant at 99.9 per cent.   
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Appendix A Probit estimations used in the PSM procedures   
 
 Dispersed ownership Dispersed ownership 
(males only) 
Dispersed ownership 
(females only) 
Female -0.058 - - 
Age under 20 -0.249* -0.364* -0.160 
Age 20-29 -0.078 -0.003 -0.123 
Age 40-49 0.080 0.108 0.036 
Age 50-59 0.114* 0.131* 0.081 
Age 60+ 0.065 0.095 0.014 
Ethnicity  0.133* 0.178* 0.062 
Married 0.051 0.072 0.043 
Dependents 0.047 0.049 0.042 
Disabled -0.032 0.036 -0.088 
Qualification: other 0.188* 0.185 0.230 
Qualification: CSE 0.103 0.083 0.119 
Qualification: O-Level 0.067 0.060 0.059 
Qualification: 1 A-Level 0.118 0.028 0.166 
Qualification: 2 A-
Levels 
0.136* 0.172 0.091 
Qualification: degree 0.248*** 0.253*** 0.248** 
Qualification: 
postgraduate 
0.373*** 0.340*** 0.441*** 
Union 0.296* 0.261*** 0.362*** 
Professional 0.146* 0.259** -0.041 
Associate Professional 0.197** 0.168* 0.225* 
Administration 0.197** 0.217* 0.141 
Skilled 0.018 0.065 0.092 
Caring -0.090 0.154 -0.206 
Sales -0.083 0.013 -0.097 
Operative -0.000 0.072 -0.415* 
Routine -0.076 -0.106 -0.067 
Tenure > 1 year -0.029 -0.052 0.023 
Tenure > 2 years -0.028 -0.056 0.020 
Tenure >5 years 0.006 -0.31 0.060 
Tenure > 10 years 0.062 0.050 0.119 
Temporary contract 0.018 0.111 -0.114 
Fixed-term contract 0.556*** 0.718*** 0.443** 
Individual PBR -0.030 -0.037 -0.004 
Group PBR 0.225*** 0.193** 0.273** 
Profit sharing 0.150** 0.175** 0.109 
Stock market 0.562*** 0.581*** 0.564*** 
Foreign 0.621*** 0.634*** 0.655*** 
Size (100-999) 0.336*** 0.343*** 0.342*** 
Size (1,000-9,999) 0.673*** 0.772*** 0.574*** 
Size (10,000+) 0.949*** 1.038*** 0.887*** 
Establishment size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Productivity 0.004 0.015 -0.009 
N 8694 4815 3907 
Pseudo R
2
 0.213 0.241 0.199 
Notes: * = significant at 95 per cent: ** = significant at 99 per cent; *** = significant at 99.9 per cent 
Industry and location dummies included 
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Endnotes 
 
1
  CEO control relative to shareholder control is defined as a greater share of the votes than that of 
the combined stake of blockholders with more than 5 per cent.  The authors use other measures of 
managerial / owner control, such as the presence of a controlling owner other than the CEO, 
individual blockholders, and institutional blockholders, with similar results.  A novelty of the 
Swedish case is widespread use of dual-class shares.  Depending on which class of shares are held, 
share-owning CEOs may have more control rights than cash-flow rights. 
  
2
 Owner-control is the obverse of this, whilst owner-managed firms are those where a manager holds 
5 per cent or more stock.   
 
3
 By contrast, in owner-controlled firms changes in pay are linked to changes in performance rather 
than changes in company size.  Owner-managed firms have pay arrangements which link employee 
pay closely to both performance and growth.  
 
4
 In addition, they use a measure of gross monthly wages that is not corrected for hours worked.   
 
5
 In Britain a company limited by guarantee is one that has members rather than shareholders, with 
the members acting as guarantors in the event of a winding-up of the company. 
 
6There are 81 employees who are the sole respondent in their workplace   
 
7
 This may overstate somewhat the earnings of some of those in the top category (the ASHE survey 
finds that earnings at the top of the distribution are more bunched than the WERS procedure 
assumes).    
 
8
 Respondents can choose one from seventeen categories to indicate which ethnic group they 
consider themselves to belong to. 
 
9
 Thus, profit sharing could add to the ownership premium, given the more widespread use of profit 
sharing for employees in dispersed ownership workplaces.  
 
10
 Previous version of WERS use a 50 rather than 25 per cent ownership threshold.  The way the 
question is phrased in WERS 2004 can mean that some concentrated ownership workplaces are 
coded as dispersed.   
